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ON THE NATURE OF CORPORATIONS
Lynn A. Stout*
Legal experts traditionally distinguish corporations from unin-
corporated business forms by focusing on corporate characteristics
like limited shareholder liability, centralized management, perpetual
life, and free transferability of shares. While such approaches have
value, this essay argues that the nature of the corporation can be bet-
ter understood by focusing on a fifth, often-overlooked, characteristic
of corporations: their capacity to "lock in" equity investors' initial
capital contributions by making it far more difficult for those inves-
tors to subsequently withdraw assets from the firm. Like a tar pit, a
corporation is much easier for equity investors to get into, than to get
out of.
An emerging school has begun to explore the implications of this
idea for corporate law and practice. The idea is still novel enough to
lack a uniformly accepted label-in addition to the phrase "capital
lock-in, " theorists have described this aspect of incorporation as "af-
firmative asset partitioning, " "the absence of a repurchase condition,"
and "asset separation from shareholders." Whatever label one
chooses, the idea shows great promise for illuminating a variety of
thorny problems that have long troubled corporate scholars and prac-
titioners.
In illustration, this essay considers how the idea of capital lock-
in sheds light on three corporate mysteries: the sui generis nature of
corporate directors' fiduciary duties; the rise of the large modern ser-
vice partnership; and lawmakers' enthusiasm for meddling with cor-
porate governance rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whenever lawyers discuss the differences between corporations and
unincorporated business forms, one is inevitably reminded of the parable
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law; Principal Investiga-
tor, UCLA-Sloan Research Program on Business Organizations. This essay is based on remarks pre-
pared for the University of Illinois College of Law Conference on Uncorporation: A New Age, held
on April 23, 2004, in Chicago, Illinois. I would like to thank the participants at that conference for
their many helpful questions and remarks. I am also indebted to Iman Anabtawi, Stephen Bainbridge,
Steven Bank, Margaret Blair, Harold Demsetz, Victor Fleischer, Henry Hansmann, Bob Hillman, Bill
Klein, Lynn LoPucki, and Larry Ribstein for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
of the four blind men and the elephant. Four blind men were invited to
touch an elephant in order to learn more about its nature. Approaching
the elephant, the first blind man took hold of its trunk. "Aha!" he cried.
"The elephant is like a snake." The second blind man grabbed the
pachyderm's tail. "No," he said, "the elephant is like a rope." The third
blind man grasped a leg and announced, "I disagree. The elephant is like
a tree." The fourth blind man placed his palms against the animal's side.
"You are each mistaken," he observed. "The elephant is like a wall."
Something similar happens whenever legal experts gather together
to debate the essential difference between corporations and unincorpo-
rated business forms such as partnerships or proprietorships. Some say
limited liability is the key, and that what makes a corporation a corpora-
tion is the fact that equity investors are not personally liable for the en-
tity's debts. Others argue that the hallmark of a corporation is the cen-
tralization of control in the hands of a small group of individuals. Still
others focus on the corporate characteristic of perpetual life, or the op-
portunity public corporations offer equity investors to freely transfer
their shares in a liquid secondary market.'
Each view is correct in its fashion. Yet my sympathies lie with the
arguments of an alternative, emerging school of corporate theorists.
These theorists might be likened to the fourth blind man who thought
the elephant was like a wall. They argue that, the corporation also is like
a wall-or, as some of the new school have-put it, like a partition.
II. "CAPITAL LOCK-IN" AND SPECIFIC INVESTMENT
I am referring here to an idea that has been percolating through
corporate scholarship only for the past decade or so. As a result, it is still
new enough to lack a universally accepted label. Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman have coined the phrase "affirmative asset partition-
ing" to describe this important and increasingly talked-about characteris-
tic of incorporated business.2 Economist Harold Demsetz has described
it as "the absence of a repurchase condition,"3 while Bill Klein and Jack
Coffee use the phrase "asset separation from shareholders."4 In a recent
article exploring the idea in depth, Margaret Blair has employed the
1. Any student of corporate law is likely to recognize this list of characteristics as the four fac-
tors often cited as the essential and distinguishing marks of the corporate form. See, e.g., ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) (citing these four factors); Steven A. Bank, Federalizing
the Tax-Free Merger: Toward an End To the Anachronistic Reliance on State Corporation Laws, 77
N.C. L. REV. 1307, 1364-65 (1999) (describing how tax law traditionally used these four factors to dis-
tinguish corporations from other business forms).
2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L. J. 387,393 (2000).
3. HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM 50-51 (1995).
4. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 108 (9th ed. 2004).
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pithy term "capital lock-in" to capture this essential characteristic of the
corporate form.'
Whatever label one chooses-I adopt "capital lock-in" below, on
grounds of brevity and concreteness -the underlying idea is straightfor-
ward. In brief, an essential if often-overlooked difference between unin-
corporated and incorporated business forms lies in the latter's capacity to
make it easier for equity investors to commit their financial contributions
irretrievably to the firm. A corporation's assets belong to the corpora-
tion, and not to its equity investors. As a result, those assets cannot be
unilaterally withdrawn from the firm by either its shareholders, or the
creditors of its shareholders.
To see how corporations differ from partnerships in this regard,
consider the case of Adam, Betty, and Charlie, who each want to con-
struct a widget factory. No single one of them has enough financial capi-
tal to undertake the project. Adam, Betty, and Charlie consequently de-
cide to pool their resources, each contributing one-third of the money
needed. If they pool their resources under the default rules of partner-
ship law, any one of the three investors can unilaterally demand the
partnership be dissolved and the value of its assets distributed back to
the partners -even if this requires the widget factory to be dismantled or
sold off.6 In essence, each partner retains the right to demand the return
of the value of his or her interest in the partnership.
In contrast, if Adam, Betty, and Charlie form a corporation and
each contributes money in return for one-third of its shares, it now be-
comes far more difficult for any one of the three to unilaterally withdraw
the value of his or her contribution. Under the default rules of corporate
5. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organiz-
ers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 388-89 (2003). The idea of capital lock-in both
supports and is supported by other recent developments in corporate theory. For example, in a series
of articles written both alone and together, Margaret Blair and I have catalogued the many ways in
which the law and practice of director governance in modern public corporations limits the ability of
shareholders and other groups to withdraw assets from the firm without director approval, thus pro-
tecting and encouraging firm-specific investment. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 275, 278 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout,
Team Production]; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Medi-
ating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403,405-08 (2001); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-
So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1195-99 (2002) [hereinafter
Stout, Shareholder Primacy]; Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 680-86
(2003) [hereinafter Stout, Ulysses]. Stephen Bainbridge has also emphasized the importance of direc-
tor governance, for different reasons. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 552-60 (2003).
6. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr §§ 801-807 (1997), 6 U.L.A. (pt. 1) 189-211 (2001) (describing rules for
dissolving and winding up partnerships after disassociation of partner); see also UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP Acr
§§ 801-812 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 84-95 (2003) [hereinafter RULPA § - ] (describing rules for dissolving
and winding up limited partnerships after disassociation of general partner). Similar default rules gen-
erally apply to the newly developed business form called the Limited Liability Company (LLC). See,
e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr §§ 601, 602, 701 (1996), 6A U.L.A. 608-11, 614-16 (2003) (describing
how LLC members have presumptive right to disassociate from LLC at any time and to demand the
LLC repurchase their interest for its fair value).
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law, a shareholder who wants his or her money back must either: (1) find
a buyer willing to pay full price for his or her shares; (2) convince the cor-
poration's board of directors to repurchase them; or (3) petition a court
for redress (an unlikely scenario). Like a tar pit, a corporation is much
easier for an equity investor to get into, than to get out of.
This quality of corporate entities-whether called affirmative asset
partitioning, capital lock-in, or the absence of a repurchase condition-
may come closer than any other to capturing the essential difference be-
tween incorporated and unincorporated business forms. It may also go a
long way towards explaining why the corporation has evolved into the
dominant business form for pursuing certain kinds of large, long-term
economic projects.
To understand why, it is essential to recognize that while capital
lock-in on first inspection seems to disadvantage equity investors, it of-
fers important benefits for certain kinds of production. In particular, a
capacity to lock in investment capital may be essential for projects that
require large amounts of firm-specific assets, meaning assets that cannot
be withdrawn from the firm without destroying much of their value.
Specific assets can take a variety of forms. They include, for example,
sunk-cost investments-past expenditures of time or money made in the
hope of future rewards. Highly specialized equipment that cannot be
easily converted for other uses also is firm-specific. (The left rail of a
railroad track is useless without the right rail.) A third example is firm-
specific human capital-managers' and employees' investment in knowl-
edge, skills, and contacts that are uniquely useful to their present firm,
and of little value to other potential employers.7
The problem posed by firm-specific investment, and the way incor-
poration helps to solve it, can be illuminated by considering again the
case of Adam, Betty, and Charlie. Suppose each contributes one-third of
the money needed to construct a customized widget manufacturing facil-
ity. Once the money is spent and the factory built, the three investors'
money has been converted into an asset that is to a large extent specific
to the widget-producing enterprise. In lay terms, this means that each
investor's one-third share can achieve its highest value only when com-
bined with the other two-thirds. (A third of a customized widget factory,
alone, is not worth much, perhaps no more than its value as scrap metal.)
As a result, there is no easy way for any one of the three investors
to withdraw his or her share without harming its value and, by extension,
the collective value of the joint enterprise. Adam, Betty, and Charlie-
7. To say that firm-specific assets lose their value when withdrawn from the firm does not mean
that all such assets can be locked in the firm. Employees can leave firms relatively easily, for example,
and when they do the value of their firm specific human capital evaporates. Sometimes, however, it is
possible to lock in investments, as in the case of the widget factory described in the text. Locking in
such investments can protect the value of other firm-specific assets by ensuring that the firm will re-
main alive and healthy for some period.
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or any successors who buy their interests-reap the highest value from
their investment by keeping the widget factory together and sharing in
the profits from widget production. As a result, if the business is formed
as a partnership, Adam, Betty, and Charlie must now worry that at some
time in the future one of the three co-investors will want, or need, to
withdraw his or her interest. Adam may stay up late nights worrying that
if Betty sees a wonderful investment opportunity come along, she might
want to withdraw her one-third interest from the partnership, requiring a
break-up or fire sale of the factory that threatens much of the value of
the other two-thirds. Betty may similarly worry that Charlie, who is a
compulsive gambler, will go to Atlantic City and lose big at the craps ta-
ble, and that Charlie's creditors-husky men with five o'clock shadows
and New Jersey accents-may demand the value of his share, requiring
the factory to either be dismantled or sold in a hasty fashion that threat-
ens Betty's investment.
Co-investors who contribute to projects that require large amounts
of firm-specific investment accordingly can find themselves at risk from
each other, and from each others' creditors.8 At the extreme, one could
even imagine the spectacle of Adam, Betty, and Charlie each opportunis-
tically threatening to withdraw his or her one-third interest in the widget
partnership-in effect, each threatening to take his or her third of the
factory and go home-unless given ninety percent of the profits.9
Unless these risks can be tempered, investors like Adam, Betty, and
Charlie might well decide against pooling their money together to build a
widget factory in the first place. Similarly, other complex economic pro-
jects that require the commitment of large amounts of specific assets over
long periods of time-for example, building railroads, canals, assembly
lines, retail brands, communications networks, or software empires -may
be discouraged if equity investors are free to unilaterally withdraw their
interests. As Demsetz has put it, "The corporation... cannot be in con-
tinual jeopardy of losing assets to its disappointed shareholders."'"
This is where the creation of an incorporated legal entity comes in
handy. Suppose that instead of pooling their funds in a partnership,
Adam, Betty, and Charlie each contribute money to a corporation in re-
turn for one-third of its stock. Now the corporation uses the funds to
build the widget factory. The factory belongs to the corporate entity-
not to Adam, Betty, and Charlie, who own only stock. Owning stock
gives them a right to cast votes to elect the corporation's board of direc-
8. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have emphasized how specific investments can
pose problems for potential creditors of a joint enterprise, making it more difficult for large-scale joint
enterprises to borrow money unless they can somehow assure lenders that essential specific assets will
remain within the firm. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 411.
9. As Larry Ribstein points out in his contribution to this Symposium, such extreme behavior
might give rise to claims of bad faith. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REv. 209,243.
10. See DEMSETZ,Ssupra note 3, at 51.
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tors, and to participate in any dividends the board declares. It does not,
however, give them the unilateral right to withdraw their interests. The
factory can only be broken up, sold off, or distributed to the shareholders
if this is agreeable to the party that as a matter of law controls the corpo-
ration's assets -the corporation's board of directors. The end result is
that, as long as neither Adam, nor Betty, nor Charlie enjoys complete
control over the board (as none of the three can without owning a clear
majority of shares), all have "tied their own hands" by making it harder
to withdraw their investments." This apparently self-defeating behavior
may in fact be self-serving if it encourages profitable joint investment in
the first place.
The growing literature on capital lock-in accordingly suggests how
an ability to stop investors (and their creditors) from subsequently with-
drawing their interests in a joint project may be essential to many forms
of economic production. This does not mean that incorporation locks in
capital completely. Under some circumstances, for example, sharehold-
ers owning a majority or supermajority of shares can collectively demand
that a corporation be liquidated, or vote out a recalcitrant board that re-
fuses to pay them a dividend as large as they would like. Nor is incorpo-
ration the only way to lock in capital. One could imagine a web of for-
mal agreements, contracts, and trusts by and among partners and their
creditors that accomplish the same goal.
But as Blair, Hansmann, and Kraakman have explained in some de-
tail, incorporation may often be the cleanest, cheapest, and most effec-
tive way to lock assets into a joint enterprise.12 This observation may do
much to explain the growth of the corporation into the dominant form of
large-scale business today. It may also be essential to understanding
many aspects of corporate law and practice that are difficult to explain if
we focus only on such much-cited corporate characteristics as limited li-
ability, perpetual life, centralized management, or free transferability of
interest.
To test this hypothesis," I consider below whether the corporate
characteristic of capital lock-in can offer insight into puzzles raised by
three participants in this symposium. These puzzles are: (1) the unique
nature of corporate directors' fiduciary duties; (2) the distinction, if any,
between corporations and partnerships in a world with both small close
corporations and large-scale partnerships; and (3) the relative fondness
11. See Stout, Ulysses, supra note 5, at 677-89. This analysis does not, of course, apply to corpo-
rations that have a single shareholder, and it applies to a lesser degree to firms with a single controlling
shareholder. Such situations are relatively rare, however. Casual observation suggests that the vast
majority of active, operating corporations of any significant size have multiple shareholders, even
though those shareholders may be relatively few in number.
12. See sources cited infra notes 2 & 5.
13. Because I did not select these three puzzles-the remarks of the scholars who raise them
were assigned to me for commentary before the conference organizer had any notion of my thesis-
self-selection is not an issue in determining the results of the test. Sample size certainly may be.
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state and federal lawmakers seem to display for meddling with the rules
that govern corporate entities.
III. THREE PUZZLES
Let us begin with the puzzle raised by Larry Ribstein's contribution
to this symposium: whether the duties that partners in a partnership owe
each other can be described as fiduciary duties. 4
Ribstein argues that it is a mistake to apply the concept of fiduciary
duty to the relationship between partners in a partnership. He suggests
such broad use glosses over an important reality: partners are burdened
with duties that are quite different from the archetypal fiduciary duties
corporate law imposes on corporate directors. 5 Ribstein in particular
emphasizes that corporate directors are burdened by what he calls "a
duty of unselfishness"-a legal demand that in managing the firm, they
consider only what is best for the firm and its shareholders, and pay no
attention whatsoever to what is best for themselves. 6
Two clarifications are worth making before we explore this idea fur-
ther. First, Ribstein's argument compares partners' duties with those of
corporate directors. 7 Many corporate scholars might find this compari-
son jarring from the start. In many ways, partners' fiduciary duties seem
to map much more closely onto the duties that corporate law imposes on
controlling shareholders, than the duties corporate law imposes on direc-
tors. This observation and a possible explanation for it are explored in
greater detail below.
Second, Ribstein's "duty of unselfishness" might be more clearly la-
beled, at least in the director context, as a "duty of extreme unselfish-
ness." Most legal rules demand some degree of unselfish behavior. The
law against murder, for example, requires us to refrain from taking oth-
ers' lives even when this would be personally convenient or satisfying.
Yet as Ribstein observes, the degree of unselfishness required of corpo-
rate directors goes far beyond what law demands of us in most contexts.
The rule of negligence, for example, demands we refrain from acciden-
tally injuring others when the probable losses (to them) exceed the costs
of taking precautions (to us)."8 But we are free to behave selfishly by im-
posing "efficient" risks on others.'9 In contrast, a corporate director's fi-
duciary duty of loyalty precludes her from considering her own interests
to any extent. In making business decisions, directors are supposed to
focus only on what is best for the firm and its shareholders. They are
14. See Ribstein, supra note 9.
15. See id. at 237-51.
16. See id. at 216.
17. See id. at 238-46.
18. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS 93-97 (1992) (discussing rule of negligence).
19. Id.
No. 1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
also restricted from using their positions to extract any personal pecuni-
ary benefit beyond their agreed-upon directors' fees. If a director should
find herself in a situation where she could personally profit from voting
for one business strategy rather than another (as directors sometimes do,
especially when they also fill executive roles), the business judgment rule
no longer insulates her decision from judicial scrutiny. Instead, if a direc-
tor takes a "corporate opportunity" or enters an "interested" transaction
with her firm, a disgruntled shareholder can bring a claim of breach of
duty of loyalty, and the burden will be on the director to demonstrate to
the court that her decisions were intrinsically fair to the firm and its
shareholders."
Partnership law takes quite a different approach. Unlike corporate
directors, partners are not burdened with a duty of extreme unselfish-
ness: they are not automatically subject to legal scrutiny when they make
decisions that enrich themselves. To the contrary, personal enrichment is
an expected benefit of being a partner. Of course, partners are subject to
other duties, including the basic requirement that, when a partner causes
the partnership to distribute wealth, he must be prepared to share that
wealth with his fellow partners.2 But no one expects partners to ignore
their own interests in making business decisions.
Why does corporate law demand so much more selflessness from
corporate directors than the default rules of partnership demand from
partners? Ribstein argues the answer can be found in the relative vul-
nerability of investors in firms with centralized management. Looking
at the problem through the lens of the capital lock-in literature offers
deeper insight into this explanation.
In brief, the idea that corporations exist primarily to lock in capital
suggests that corporate directors and partners are burdened with differ-
ent legal duties because they play very different economic roles in firms.
Partners are co-investors who expect to act as "residual claimants" in the
partnership: that is, to share in any profits the business makes after it has
paid its contractual debts to its employees, creditors, and so forth. The
economic role that partners play in partnerships thus is analogized best
not to the role played by directors in corporations, but to the role played
by shareholders. This is why the fiduciary duty corporate law imposes on
20. See generally Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 298-99 (discussing duty of
loyalty). In addition to their duty of loyalty, directors also owe their firms a duty of care. The duty of
care demands a more limited degree of unselfishness in the sense that, like the negligence rule, it re-
quires directors only to exercise reasonable (not obsessive) care. Thus, after directors have met some
minimum standard, they can devote the balance of their time and attention to their own projects. The
degree of self-interested director behavior allowed under the duty of care is expanded still further by
the business judgment rule, which insulates directors from liability for their decisions provided they do
not extract any personal benefit and are duly informed. See generally Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Pro-
cedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment
Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 675 (2002).
21. See Ribstein, supra note 9, at 244-45 (discussing sharing rule in partnerships).
22. Id. at 227.
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controlling shareholders -most significantly, a duty not to use their con-
trol over the firm to cause the firm to make payments to them that the
minority shareholders do not also receive -resembles the sharing duty
partnership law imposes on partners.23
Directors play a very different part in corporations and, as a conse-
quence, are subject to very different legal constraints. Unlike sharehold-
ers, directors qua directors are neither investors nor residual claimants in
the firm.24  Indeed, a director can join a board without making any in-
vestment whatsoever, and her only legal claims on the firm's assets are
her right to her promised director's fee and her right to be indemnified
for expenses she incurs on the corporation's behalf. Thus, corporate di-
rectors, unlike shareholders or partners, have no incentive to try to with-
draw essential assets from the corporation. To the contrary, if they want
to keep their firms alive and healthy (and so keep their positions as di-
rectors), they want to discourage other groups, such as shareholders,
from trying to withdraw too large a share of the firm's assets.
In other writings, Margaret Blair and I have explored this peculiar-
ity of directors' incentives in some detail. We propose that it explains
why shareholders in public corporations take the otherwise puzzling step
of ceding control over firms to boards in the first place.' Applying team
production analysis, we argue that co-investors in projects that need
large commitments of specific capital often understand intuitively that, in
order to protect the value of the joint project, they need to place control
over it into the hands of someone who has neither motive nor easy op-
portunity to profit from withdrawing assets from the firm.26 In a corpora-
tion, this someone is a board of directors subject to the severe constraints
on self-interest imposed by the rules of fiduciary duty.
Understanding the unusual role directors play in corporations con-
sequently sheds light on the sui generis nature of directors' fiduciary du-
ties. It also supports Ribstein's argument that we may lose important in-
23. Id. at 224-25 (discussing sharing rule applied to controlling shareholders); see also JAMES D.
Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 258 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that, especially in close corpo-
rations, "the controlling stockholder's fiduciary obligation is increasingly viewed as being akin to the
obligation that partners owe to one another").
24. Individuals who serve as directors of the firm may be able to extract assets from the firm if
they also play roles as shareholders or officers. When they do, however, their decisions are no longer
privileged under the business judgment rule, but instead are subject to additional legal duties and judi-
cial oversight. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20 (discussing directors' interested transactions
and controlling shareholders' duties).
25. See generally Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 315-19 (discussing directors'
role); Stout, Ulysses, supra note 5, at 685-88 (discussing directors' incentives).
26. This solution to the problem of encouraging specific joint investment has a catch, of course.
Because directors are not residual claimants, they do not have an incentive to withdraw resources from
the firm, but they also do not have an incentive to run the firm with maximum efficiency. Instead, as
we actually observe, directors manage firms in a satisficing but suboptimal fashion. This "second best"
solution may nevertheless be the most attractive of the available alternatives in a world where eco-
nomic production can require massive amounts of firm specific investment that cannot be adequately
protected by formal contract. See generally Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 319 (dis-
cussing second best nature of board governance); Stout, Ulysses, supra note 5, at 685-88 (same).
No. 1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
formation when we apply the same label to directors' duties that we ap-
ply to the duties partners and shareholders owe each other. And it is cer-
tainly a mistake to apply the word fiduciary to still-more-distant obliga-
tions, such as those that may arise from relationships among family
members. Thus, Ribstein rightly criticizes the Second Circuit's opinion
in United States v. Chestman, which suggested that confidential relation-
ships among various members of the Waldbaum family might give rise to
"the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship" for purposes of
creating insider trading liability."
Accordingly, a focus on the capital lock-in function of incorpora-
tion, and on the unique governance role boards of directors play in up-
holding that function, helps explain both the peculiar nature of directors'
fiduciary duties as "mediating hierarchs" in a public corporation, and the
ways these duties differ from partners' and shareholders' duties to each
other as co-investors?8 Similarly, it may offer insight into a second prob-
lem explored in Robert Hillman's paper for this symposium on the dis-
tinctions between partnerships and corporations in terms of bargaining
and management structure. 9
Hillman's paper starts with a conundrum. He notes that one of the
standard distinctions thought to exist between partnership law and cor-
porate law is that partnerships are believed to be more flexible, and to
permit a much greater degree of bargaining over firm structure than nor-
mally is practicable in a corporation.30  He also notes that egalitarian
management and shared power are thought to be hallmarks of a partner-
ship.31 In contrast, highly centralized and hierarchical management styles
are thought to be the norm in corporations.32
Hillman then points out a pair of interesting and telling anomalies.
These anomalies are small, closely-held corporations, and large modern
partnerships such as law firms or accounting firms. Hillman argues that
these common business forms pose a challenge to any claim that partner-
ships are characterized by flexibility and more egalitarian management
27. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991); see Ribstein, supra note 9, at
229-30 (discussing Chestman decision). As Ribstein describes in some detail, such loose use of legal
language can be costly, increasing the cost of negotiating transactions, increasing the risk of opportun-
istic litigation, and raising the possibility that overuse will "squander the moral authority" of courts
who employ the word "fiduciary." See id. at 1235-37. Although at the end of the day one might con-
clude that there is little harm done by applying the word "fiduciary" broadly so long as courts and
business people understand the distinctions between the relationships and duties that business partici-
pants owe each other in particular circumstances, I believe Ribstein has succeeded in placing the bur-
den of persuasion on those who would advance this argument.
28. See generally Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 276-87 (discussing directors'
role as mediating hierarchs).
29. See Robert W. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, Corporate Law, and Pri-
vate Ordering Within Closely-Held Business Associations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 171.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 180-81.
32. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP L. 819, 827-29 (1999) (discussing the hierarchical nature of
corporations).
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than corporations.33 After all, in the typical close corporation there often
is a great deal of effort devoted to negotiating customized charter terms,
bylaws, and shareholder agreements, and this flexibility is supported by
the basic rules of corporation law.34 Close corporation shareholders also
usually are active participants in the firm's day-to-day management.3"
Conversely, in a large service partnership (think of the law firm or ac-
counting firm with offices in ten different cities), it is unrealistic to be-
lieve that any real bargaining occurs when a new partner is welcomed
into a thousand-member firm.36 Moreover, and in contrast to the egali-
tarian management observed in many close corporations, these large
partnerships are usually characterized by the same sorts of hierarchical
management structures we see in the Fortune 500.
37
In other words, Hillman observes, neither the presence or absence
of bargaining, nor the choice of centralized or decentralized manage-
ment, seem to be immutable characteristics of either partnerships or in-
corporated business forms.3" What, then, distinguishes the two?39
Incorporation's capacity to lock in investor capital may provide the
answer. A focus on capital lock-in suggests that incorporation may often
be attractive not because it makes centralized management easier or
when flexibility is unnecessary, but because a particular form of eco-
nomic production demands a high degree of firm specific investment,
making an ability to keep those investments in the firm essential to the
firm's health.
This approach offers a useful and testable prediction: we should
expect to see systematic differences between the types of businesses that
are incorporated as large corporations, and the types that are run as large
partnerships. Most obviously, we should expect large firms to be organ-
ized as partnerships only for economic projects where firm specific in-
vestment either is relatively unimportant, or locking that investment in is
for some reason impracticable.
This approach may explain why large partnerships have evolved
primarily in client-centered service industries like accounting and law. In
these industries, human capital investments often are the primary source
of firm value. To a very large extent, those human capital investments
are not firm-specific but instead take form of general human capital (e.g.,
33. See Hillman, supra note 29, at 180-81.
34. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 1011-20 (1995) (discuss-
ing the adaptability of the governance system in close corporations).
35. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 302.
36. See Hillman, supra note 29, at 185.
37. See id. at 183.
38. See id. at 185.
39. At one time it could be argued that professional rules precluded law firms from incorporat-
ing. Now, however, most states permit law firms to incorporate or to use professional corporation
business forms. A high percentage of large law firms nevertheless retain a partnership structure. Scott
Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical Study of New York
Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 107, 110.
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active membership in a particular bar or expertise in a type of account-
ing) that a partner can easily take from one firm to another. Much of the
balance may be "client-specific" human capital-knowledge of and con-
tacts with a particular client-which again can often be moved relatively
easily, with little loss in value. Thus, because firm-specific investment is
of relatively little importance to the typical law or accounting firm (and,
given the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, very difficult to
lock in in any case), the capital lock-in advantages of incorporation have
little appeal.'
A focus on capital lock-in consequently may promote a better un-
derstanding of the fundamental economic differences between partner-
ships and corporations just as it promotes a better understanding of the
unique nature of directors' fiduciary duties. Can it also tell us something
about the third puzzle, posed by Saul Levmore in his paper for this sym-
posium: why both state and federal lawmakers seem so much more will-
ing to meddle in (and so much more interested in meddling with) the
governance rules that apply to corporations, than the rules that apply to
unincorporated business forms?4
Once again, capital lock-in provides at least some of the answer.
This is not to suggest that capital lock-in explains all of the enthusiasm
lawmakers show for regulating corporations, or that other explanations
may not exist as well. Yet corporations' unique ability to attract large
amounts of firm-specific investment-an ability derived in large part
from the possibility of lock-in-may go far towards explaining why zeal-
ous regulators seem far more interested in intervening in the internal af-
fairs of corporations, than they do in intervening in the internal govern-
ance structures of other sorts of business organizations.
In brief, by acting as sinks for large amounts of firm-specific invest-
ment, corporations make themselves especially tempting targets for rent-
seeking legislation. This argument relies on the so-called economic the-
ory of legislation, which posits that interest groups often seek to "bribe"
lawmakers with campaign contributions and lobbyist attention into pass-
ing legal rules that favor the interest group (often at some other group's
expense)." Savvy regulators may also seek to extract "blackmail" pay-
ments from interest groups by entertaining proposed changes in law or
regulation that threaten those groups' welfare.4' Because of capital lock-
40. Anecdotal evidence of the relative unimportance of firm-specific investment to lawyers and
accountants may be found by observing what happens to lawyers and accountants whose firms collapse
(e.g., the accountants at Arthur Anderson). My sense is that most of these individuals quickly find
similar positions at other firms.
41. See Saul Levmore, Uncorporations and the Delaware Strategy, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 195.
42. See generally BARNES & STOUT, supra note 18, at 476-91 (surveying theory of interest-group
rent-seeking).
43. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean
Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 79-81 (1991) (arguing that lawmakers sometimes black-
mail interest groups).
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in, corporations should attract this type of lawmaking, and this type of
lawmaker, the way a large carcass attracts flies.
To understand why, it is important to understand that board gov-
ernance does more than encourage equity investors to make investments
in corporations. By locking in capital, board governance also attracts
firm-specific investments and commitments from a variety of other
groups.44 Unsecured creditors, for example, may be more willing to lend
to the firm. Employees from the shop floor to the corner office may be
more willing to acquire firm-specific skills and to contribute extra hours
and extra effort. Even customers and the local community may make
specific investments and contributions, on the assumption that the firm
will stick around for some period of time. Consider the case of the con-
sumer who masters a particular software program, or the town that
builds roads, schools, and other specialized infrastructure to support a
factory.
By attracting large amounts of specific investment from so many dif-
ferent constituencies, corporations turn these constituencies into poten-
tial adversaries who may benefit or suffer from changes in the firm's
structure that reallocate shares of the corporate pie. Shareholders seek-
ing better profits, for example, may lobby to shut down expensive U.S.-
based production and move manufacturing abroad, while local employ-
ees and communities lobby to keep factories at home. Normally such
competing constituencies focus their attention on the company's board of
directors, trying to convince the board to adopt whichever business strat-
egy favors their interests. Shareholders ask for larger dividends, execu-
tives seek bigger bonuses, and rank-and-file employees lobby for pen-
sions or a better health plan.
As an alternative, however, competing corporate constituencies can
sometimes try to do an end run around board governance by turning to
lawmakers as vehicles for rent-seeking from other participants in the
firm-other participants who cannot protect their firm-specific interests
simply by withdrawing them. Lawmakers accordingly can attract a great
deal of attention (and campaign contributions) by responding to appeals
from various corporate participants to change the rules in the middle of
the corporate game. Consider, for example, how a state legislator con-
sidering a "constituency statute" might suddenly become popular with
unions, institutional investors, and the Business Roundtable. Similarly,
the Securities and Exchange Commission in recent months has attracted
the frenzied attention of the business world by playing with the notion of
reforming the shareholder proxy process to give shareholders greater
power.45
44. See generally Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 302-09; Stout, Shareholder
Primacy, supra note 5, at 1195-98.
45. See, e.g., Louis Lavelle, Governance: Backlash in the Executive Suite, Bus. WK., June 14,
2004, at 37 (describing how Securities and Exchange Commission's proposal to change proxy rules has
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These sorts of regulatory initiatives tend to provoke strong reac-
tions from various corporate constituencies because those constituencies
have large amounts of firm-specific investment at risk. In contrast, legis-
lators have far less power to threaten the interests of investors in enter-
prises who can easily withdraw their investments. Any legislative at-
tempt to intervene in the internal affairs of large law partnerships, for
example, is unlikely to provoke much in the way of lobbying efforts or
campaign contributions. The reason is simple: unlike shareholders
whose interests are diluted by executive stock options or communities
whose economies rely on a factory, a disgruntled law partner can simply
leave one law firm to join or start another, taking his general human
capital and client-specific human capital with him. Thus, regulators and
politicians like to tinker with corporate governance rules more than they
like to tinker with partnership governance rules for the same reason
Willy Sutton liked to rob banks: because that's where the money is.
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay has explored the value of the concept of capital lock-in as
a fundamental characteristic of corporations by suggesting how it may
shed light on three different corporate mysteries: the unique nature of
directors' fiduciary duties; the evolution of the large modern service
partnership; and the peculiar fascination lawmakers seem to have for
tinkering with the rules that govern the internal affairs of corporations.
In each case, inspecting the problem through the lens of the emerging
scholarship on capital lock-in goes a long way towards developing our
understanding. These three examples support the view that capital lock-
in is an essential, if previously overlooked, characteristic of the corporate
form that does much of the work that needs to be done to distinguish
corporations from unincorporated business forms.
This observation is subject to two important caveats. First, I do not
intend to suggest that capital lock-in is somehow unique to corporations.
The ease with which equity investors can withdraw their investments is a
variable that exists along a continuum of business forms. At one extreme
of the continuum, the owner of a sole proprietorship can withdraw re-
sources almost without restriction. At the other extreme, in large public
corporations, shareholders' returns depend almost entirely on the deci-
sions of a board largely insulated from their command and control.
Partnerships, limited partnerships, close corporations, and LLCs lie
somewhere in between, depending on their structure and governance
provisions. And just as we have seen a trend toward allowing other busi-
ness forms to adopt such typically corporate characteristics as limited li-
ability or centralized management, we can expect to see business law
triggered lobbying by a variety of institutional investors, union organizations, and corporate managers,
as well as the Business Roundtable).
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move (perhaps more slowly) toward allowing other forms to adopt
greater capital lock-in.46
The second caveat is that, in exploring the role of capital lock-in, I
do not intend to suggest that other variables that corporate scholars tra-
ditionally have emphasized are somehow unimportant or irrelevant. To
the contrary, there are a variety of significant issues in business law and
practice that are best understood by focusing on corporate characteristics
like limited liability or free transferability of shares (although in some
cases, these characteristics may themselves be better understood by tak-
ing account of lock-in). 7 To return to the parable, just as each of the
blind men was correct to say that the elephant was like a snake, a rope,
and a tree, corporate scholars and practitioners are correct to observe
that public corporations tend to have limited liability, perpetual life, cen-
tralized management, and freely transferable shares, and each of these
can explain many aspects of business law and practice.
Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that for now and for many
years to come, the scholarly returns from analyzing corporations through
the lens of the emerging literature on capital lock-in may often exceed
the scholarly returns from following more customary approaches. This is
in part because the idea of capital lock-in is relatively novel, and its
scholarly terrain has only begun to be explored. As a result, the new
school holds great promise for explaining a wide variety of issues that
have long troubled corporate scholars and practitioners. Yet innovation
alone may not explain all the power of this emerging concept. Board
governance and capital lock-in, while not the only characteristics to sepa-
rate corporations from other business forms, may well prove in many
cases to be the most vital and unique characteristics. Put differently, if I
were forced to choose, I would adopt the perspective of the blind man
who thought the elephant resembled a wall. Like the scholar or practi-
tioner who thinks the corporation resembles a partition, he may have
come closest to the heart of the beast.
46. An example may be found in the default rules for limited partnerships, which do not permit
limited partners to unilaterally dissociate from the firm and demand its winding up, but give unilateral
withdrawal rights only to general partners. See RULPA §§ 601-604,801-803 (describing rules for lim-
ited partner disassociation and for dissolving and winding up limited partnerships after disassociation
of general partner).
47. For example, corporations may have evolved freely transferable shares as a means of com-
pensating for the illiquidity equity investors would otherwise suffer as a result of lock-in.
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